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THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the last month the regular weekly meetings of the Allison Society have
been well attended. The members have
shown marked interest in the proceedings
and a determination to keep the work up
to the usual high standard is general.
On March 23, the regular -programme
was profitably varied by Prof. Woodward's
instructive lecture on Lord Mansfield.
The inter-society debate aroused no
little enthusiasm, and it is safe to say that
it has given an impetus to society work
which will long be felt.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The interest aroused by the inter-society
debate has caused an increased attendance
and loyalty to the Dickinson Society.
Such increased loyalty and attendance
during the genial spring evenings bodes
well for the future interests of this society.
Since the issuing of the last FORUM, no
less than three meetings have been devoted to work not strictly society work.
By the courtesy of the Allison Society the
members attended a lecture by Prof. F. C.
Woodward on Friday evening, March 23,
on "Lord Mansfield." Friday evening,
April 20, was devoted to a lecture by Senator Weakley on*"Processes of State Legislation," under the auspices of the Dick-

inson Society, and the inter-society debate
filled Friday evening, April 6.
At the meeting on March 30, the election of officers was held. Mr. Shellenberger also delivered a declamation en-

titled "Prairie Belle." Just at this point
the society received an invitation to visit
the Allison Society to hear the farewell
address of William A. Wanner, of Reading, who was about to leave the school.
The society accordingly adjourned to visit
the Allison Society.
April 13, coming during the Easter vacation, the regular program was dispensed
with. According to the requirements 'of
the constitution, however, the officers
were installed on this evening.
Messrs. McConnell and Talbot became
members of the organization during the
month.
The following are the present officers of
the society:
President-W. S. Clark.
Vice-President-H. J. Shellenberger.
Secretary-H. L. Henderson.
Executive Committee-W. T. Stauffer,
H. L. Henderson, F. H. Rhodes.
Treasurer-H. S. Winlack.
Dist. Atty.-E. T. Daugherty.
Sergeant at Arms-A. Light.
Prothonotary-C. S. Davis.
Warden-l. J. Ryan.
Clerk of Court-W. H. Points.
Constable-W. H. Trude.
Register of Wills-J. N. Minnich.
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WEORCAN CLUB.

LECTURE BY PROF. WOODWARD.

On the evening of March 23rd, Prof. F.
C. Woodward lectured before the Law
School, at the request of the Allison Society. The subject which he had chosen
for the lecture was "Lord Mansfield."
After giving a short review of the life of
this able jurist, he began to criticise his
life. Lord Mansfield gained his fame
when he appeared for the City of Edinburgh in the famous disfranchisement bill
because of the Porteous mob, and his defense of several English nobles on the
charge of treason.
In politics he was a Tory, and opposed
the colonies defending a weak government against the assaults of Pitt, each
contestant being at his best, as Mansfield
was stronger in defense and Pitt in attack.
From a standpoint of cold logic, Mansfield was probably superior to Pitt, but in
vehemence of assault Pitt was Mansfield's
superior. His fame, however, depends
upon his reputation as a jurist, and it is
here where he best served mankind.
In his career as a judge he effected a
number of reforms. Among them he simplified practice and procedure, and rid
both of many technicalities; he created
MAJOR PILCHER'S ENTERTAINMENT
the law of insurance; he found the EngTO THE SENIORS.
lish inercantilelaw in a chaotic state, and
left it in a form almost equivalent to a
On Wednesday evening, April 18, Major code; he fixed the rightsof colonies under
Pilcher gave a reception and dinner to his the English law; struck a fatal blow at
Senior class in Mledical Jurisprudence at
slavery; was the first to allow Quakers to
his residence on W. Pomfret St.
affirm; andalways strongly favored reliDean Trickett and Registrar Ames, of gious toleration in politics.
the college, were special guests.
The principal charges brought against
Lord iansfield are dishonesty and a lack
ALUMNI NOTES.
of moral courage. To substantiate the
latter charge, it has been contended that
Charles C. Greer, '93, was re-elected city he reversed the outlawry of Wilkes when
solicitor of Johnstown without opposition.
the case was clearly against the outlawed,
Edwin S. Comrey, formerly of the class simply because of the strong and threatening public sentiment in his favor, on
of 1901, has been admitted to practice in
the supreme and superior courts of Ten- the ground of a mere technicality, when
Mansfield's usual course was to disregard
lessee.
mere technicalities.
Joseph Jeffreys, '96, Charles McMeans,
Mr. Woodward contended, however,
'99, Charles E. Daniels, '98, Garrett B. that Mansfield's unbending devotion to
Stevens, '99, Win. M. Flannigan, '99, and the cause of
freedom of consciemce during
D. Edward Long, '99, have visited Carlisle
the Gordon riots, in which his house was
during the past week.
burned and he narrowly escaped personal
William A. Jordan, '99, has been ad- injury, shows a high degree of moral
initted to the Allegheny county bar.
courage.
Spring has done nothing to diminish
the ardor and zeal of the members of this
organization. On the contrary it seems
that each succeeding meeting is better
than the preceding, both because of the
increased interest and because of the novelty of the features of the programmes.
The greatest benefits derived by the
members of the club from the meetings,
excluding the reading of Shakespeare,
which still continues, are probably parliamentary drill and extemporaneous discussions.
The following features appeared on the
programmes of the last month:
Impromptu discussion of the question,
"Resolved, That examinations should be
abolished in colleges where the daily recitation system is in use," affirmatively
by L. F. Hess and W. H. Taylor, and
negatively by W. T. Stauffer and W. A.
Valentine; an extemporaneous speech by
A. Light on "Duties of an Attorney to
His Client ;" a declamation by L. F. Hess,
and responses to mock toasts on subjects
assigned by the president.
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having signed the bill before the house itself, the bill is handed to the Secretary of
the Commonwealth, who marks on it the
The Dickinson Society was very fortudate of reception and any objection he
nate in securing Senator Weakley to lec- may see to it, and hands it to the Goverture before the School on Friday evening,
nor. The Governor signs the bill, when
April 20th, on the subject, "Processes of it becomes a law; or vetoes it, when it is
State Legislation." A large and enthusi- lost, if not carried by both houses over his
astic audience, composed of the members
veto.
of both the Allison and Dickinson societies, greeted the ex-legislator on his apTHE INTER-SOCIETY DEBATE.
pearance.
Having been introduced by Mr. ShipThe first annual inter-society debate of
man, the President of the Allison Society, the Dickinson and Allison Societies was
Mr. Weakley proceeded to describe the held in Library Hall on Friday evening,
April 6. The members of the two socieGeneral Assembly, and its machinery for
legislation. He then showed that a bill
ties were all present and each side cheered
presented to the Legislature for passage enthusiastically for its standard bearers.
must contain only one subject, clearly ex- Never before has such enthusiasm been
pressed in the title; must contain al en- shown in any event which has taken
place in the Law School.
acting clause; that to secure its passage it
must be read at length on three separate
After several rounds of cheering and apdays in each house; it must be passed by
plause, the presiding officer, Prof. Freda majority of all the members of each eric C. Woodward, opened the meeting.
house, and the yeas and nays must be The question for discussion was, "Recalled and recorded on the passage of each
solved, That those combinations among
bill.
manufacturers which are commonly
He supposed a bill, and traced it through known as trusts are detrimental to the
the varying processes until it becomes an
public welfare." Two members of the
act. The bill is offered to the House by
Dickinson Society, Messrs. H. L. Henderan Assemblyman standing at his desk, is son and H. J. Shellenberger, upheld the
carried to the Speaker by the page, and is affirmative, while Messrs. W. S. Rotherby him referred to a committee, which meel and W. A. Valentine, of the Allison
recommends its passage or rejection. Af- Society, supported the negative of the
ter having been printed, and a copy hav- proposition. The societies were honored
ing been placed on the desk of each mem- in having as their judges on this occasion
ber, the bill is placed on the order for first Hon. Filmore Maust, John R. Miller,
reading. It then comes up for first read- Esq., and Dr. S. S. Bishop.
ing, is read section by section, and usually
Mr. Henderson, who opened the debate,
agreed to. When the bill comes up for showed that the results of the formations
second reading the House goes into com- of trusts are four, viz: To smother committee of the whole, reads the bill section
petition, to control prices, to lower wage-,
by section, and amends it or agrees to it. and to manufacture a poorer article at the
The determination of the committee of the same or a greater price. Taking the great
whole is reported to the House, when the trusts of the country as examples, he
bill is again read, section by section. The showed that wages had usually fallen
bill is usually debated on second reading, under the trusts, and where they had
and, being agreed to on second reading, risen the rise was due to general prospercomes up for third reading, when it is ity and not due to the trusts; that generagain read, section by section, and finally ally the price of the manufactured article
passed or rejected. The vote on third had risen, and where that price had fallen
reading is by yeas and nays.
the fall had not been proportionate to the
The bill is then sent to the Senate for fall in the price of raw material; how
concurrence, where it is treated just as in competition is smothered by crushing out
the House, except that it is not read in smaller concerns and by giving a reducplace. The presiding officer of each house tion to those who buy exclusively from
LECTURE BY SENATOR WEAKLEY.
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the trust; and how, as a result of paying
for the work done by the job, the article
manufactured is of a poorer quality under
the trust.
Mr. Rothermel, the second speaker,
proved that modern enterprises must
needs be conducted on so large a scale that
a large command of capital is necessary
and, as no one man has sufficient means
to carry on such enterprises, several persons must unite their capital in one organization ; that by uniting a number of
persons in the same business, a trust tends
to distribute profits among a larger number of people and enlists the intelligence
and skill of many instead of few and
thereby reduces the price of production
and increases the grade of the product;
that by concentrating a business to one
point and uniting small plants into large
ones, trusts effect an economizing in business impracticable under the old ways of
manufacturing, and that by extending
the limits of the business trusts serve the
public more generally and tend to reduce
the price of the manufactured article.
The third speaker, Mr. Shellenberger,
argued that the trust, after having driven
middlemen and small producers out of the
business by underselling them, gains a
supreme control over the market price,
and raises it to suit its own private and
selfish ends; that, as it is a principle of
trusts not to allow their profits to decrease,
and as natural causes would sometimes
cause such a decrease, trusts lower wages
at such times, and do not raise them afterward; that, as they pay for the work
which is done for them by the job, or require a certain amount of work to be done
within a certain time, the tendency is to
cause hurried work, and produce a poorer
article; and that, as the tendency of the
trust is to estrange the employer from the
employee, and to make machines of the
latter, the trust destroys the young man's
chance for future intellectual development.
The last speaker, Mr. Valentine, contended that, as trusts gather a number of
persons, and concentrate their minds on a
single object for the common benefit, any
improvements or economies which anyone of these persona discovers or practices
will be instantly reported, and thus the
entire company will secure the benefit

from such improvements or economies;
that, as trusts concentrate the manufacture of articles at fewer places, and sell a
larger quantity, they are able to give the
public an improved, product at a less price,
and still make a profit for the stockholder;
that, as trusts are able by their large capiitalization to tide over times of depression,
they will give the laborer a boon in the
shape of permanent employment; and
that, as trusts tend to reduce the hours of
labor, they give the laborer a greater
chance for intellectual improvement.
Each speaker was allotted a short time
in which to sum up. Hon. Fillmore
Maust announced the decision of the
judges to be in the affirmative by a vote of.
two to one. The result of this debate is
to have aroused a great deal of enthusiasm
among the members of the two organizations, and it is hoped that hereafter these
societies will meet yearly in friendly contests of this kind.

MOOT COURT.
MARY SMITH, BY

HER NEXT FRIEND,
vs. CUMBERLAND VALLEY
RAILROAD COMPANY.

Agency-_evocation-Attorney's right to
compromise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 1, 1895, Mary Smith was
injured by the defendant, and sustained
injury to the extent of $5,000. She employed William Jones as attorney, who
brought suit and became the attorney of
record. On May 1, 1895, Jones was discharged as attorney, and William Biddle
employed, though he did not enter an appearance untl September 1,1895. On July
1, 3,895, Jones agreed with the company to
settle, and entered into an agreement to do
so for $1,000. This was accepted, and the
money paid to Jones, and entered on the
record. Jones absconded with the money.
On November 1, 1895, William Biddle
appears in court and moves to have the
settldment stricken off.
KATz and RoBITAILLE for the plaintifi.
1. An attorney cannot settle or compromise a suit without the client's consent.
Maxfield v. Carr, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 209; Ely v.
Lamb, 34 Pa. 315; Housewick v. Miller,
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93 Pa. .14; Phila. & Reading R. R. v.
Penny., 4 Pa. 271; Mackus' Heirsv. Adam,
99 Pa. 143.
2. If the purchaser pay the money to a
person not authorized to receive it he is
liable to pay it over again. Lord'Chancellor Chumford, in Jones v. Chaplin.
LIGHT and DOUGHERTY for the defend-

ant.
1. Jones had a right to compromise the
claim. Township of Whitehall v. Keller, 12
W. N. C. 178; Miller V. Preston, 154 Pa.
63; Kissick v. Heiseter, 185 Pa. 184; Scott
v. Seiler, 5 Watts 246.
2. A revocation is effectpal and binding
only as against thosewho have notice that
it, has been made. Morgan v. Steel, 5
Binney, 305; Johnson v. Christian, 3
Wheaton 101; Com. v. Barstable Savings
Bank, 126 Mass. 526; Edwardsv. Schaffer,
22 N. Y. 183; Chaflin v. Lenheim, 66 N.
Y. 23.
3. A principal who neglects to disavow
an"act of his agent makes the act his own.
Miller v. Preston, 154 Pa. 63; Kelsey v.
Nat. Bank, 69 Pa. 427; Bredin v. Dubarry,
14S. &R. 26.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The case at bar presents three important
points: First, has an attorney the power
to compromise his client's case without
the client's consent? Second, has the R.
R. Co. a right to set-off the $1,000 paid
under such compromise against any subsequent verdict which may be rend6red?
Third, was William Biddle, the second attorney employed to conduct the plaintiff's
cause, negligent in not entering his appearance more promptly?
As to the first point, we will say that an
attorney cannot compromise his client's
case without the client's consent or sanction, for if an attorney should be allowed
io compromise without his client's consent, it would lead to many abuses and
difficulties between counsel and client,
whoserelations should be very harmonious
and confidential.
In Stokely vs. Robinson, 34 Pa. 315,
which was an action of ejeetment,
the attorneys compromised and the
court entered judgment, whereupon the
defendant sued out a writ, and assigned
the compromise for error.
Woodward, J., in his opinion said: "An
attorney is allowed to submit his client's
cause to arbitration under the arbitration
Act of 1806, but an attorney is not allowed,
and has no authority to compromise a suit

without the authority or sanction of his
client." This is just what has been done
in this case at bar; the attorney has corn
promised with the R. R. Co. without the
consent of his client, for a very much less
sum than that sued for.
In Houseneck v. Miller, 93 Pa. 514, Mr.
Justice Gordon said that an attorney,
by virtue of his professional relation, has
no power to compromise his client's case,
without the client's authority or sanction.
Houston v. Mitchell, 14 S. & R. 307;
Sackhouse v. O'Hara's Ex'rs., 14 Pa. 88;
Mackey v. Adair, 99 Pa. 143.
Jones was to bring suit to recover $5,0('0,
and not to compromise. As he had no authority to do so, we must come to the conclusion that the agreement entered into by
the attorney and the R. R. Co. is void.
The next point to be taken in consideration is whether Biddle was negligent in
not making a more prompt appearance.
We think not, as an attorney has a reasonable time within which to bring a suit,
and we do not think five months is an unreasonable time.
Another point is whether the R. R. Co.
should be allowed to set-off the $1,000
already paid against any subsequent
verdict which may be rendered. We
think not, as that was paid as a full satisfaction of the claim, and not as a part
paynient, and as the compromise was void,
the payment of the money is void, and
should not be allowed to be set off.
But it is contended that the R. R. Co.
had no notice of the revocation or dis-.
missal. This is true, but at the same time
the attorney was acting outside his emplyment, which the R. R. Co. should
have known, and is bound to know, and,
therefore, it cannot be excused on that
ground. The motion to strike off the
settlement is, therefore, granted.
J.N. LIGHTNER, J.
William Jones was employed by Mary
Smith to bring action against the Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. for $5,000 damages which she sustained on January ],
1895. He brought suit and became the attorney of record, and was discharged on
May 1, 1895, yet Jones compromised the
claim for $1,000 on July 1st, and had satisfaction entered on the record, and then absconded with the money. On May Ist
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Mary Smith employed Win. Biddle to
prosecute suit, who entered his appearance on September 1st, and on November
1, 1895, files this motion, asking that settlement be stricken off. It has been ably
contended by the counsel for the defendant that Mary Smith was negligent in not
informing the defendant of her having
discharged Win. Jones, and that because
of this, and her not being prompt in disavowing the action, that the settlement
should not be stricken off. While it is
true that a principal must promptly disavow the acts of his agent, when they
transcend the authority given him, on
pain of making the agent's acts his own,
it is so only because this silence is an implied ratification of the agent's acts, thus
estopping him from afterward denying the
agent's authority. But a ratification can
only take place where an act is voidable
in its nature, while our Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that a compromise is
absolutely void. Township of Whitehall
v. Keller, 12 W. N. 177. To a like effect
are the cases of Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S.
&. R. 307, and Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa.
315, both holding that attorneys cannot
compromise without the express consent
of their regpective clients. In the case of
Holker v. Parker, cited by defendant, the
court held that while compromises were
looked upon with disfavor, yet they would
not be disturbed if they were reasonable
and fair. We think, however, that this
compromise is obviously not reasonable
and fair; and further, since he was not
Mary Smith's attorney at time of making
it, it cannot stand on this ground.
The power to compromise is contrary to
our sense of justice. If the client sees fit
to take the chances of litigation, it should
not be for the attorney to say him nay.
When a claim is put in the hands of an
attorney for prosecution, it is generally
supposed that he will continue it to a decision, which will be reached through the
ordinary channels of adjudication; and to
this end general authority is given him.
But it would be derogatory to the best interests of the legal profession, and apt to
bring it into ill repute, by the inadvertent
use of such a power, which permits a
client's right of action to be destroyed or his
claim diminished by the faulty judgment

or caprice of his attorney. It was said in
99 Pa. 318 that a compromise of a client's
6laim by two attorneys was absolutely
void.
The question presents itself, even though
it cannot be ratified-being void-will the
plaintiff be estopped because of not notifying the defendant- of her discharge of
Jones? The plaintiff has met this argument by the statement that since he was
a special agent, it put the defendant upon
his guard, and made him look to the
authority of the agent; and further, that
since he could not make this compromise,
it being void, as against public policy,
without express consent of client, that the
defendant company was bound to see that
the agent had the express consent.
We are of the opinion that Jones was
not such a special agent, as the judges referred to in the several cases which held
that the party dealing with him inust beware, for they dealt with him at their
peril. But we look with more favor on
his second contention, and think that the
defendant company was bound to inquire
concerning the express consent given by
the principal.
Had this been done, or had the defendant company exercised even ordinary diligence, the true fact of Jones' discharge
must have become plain. It is true there
is a presumption that where an attorney
of record appears and performs some act
within the apparentscopeof his authority,
that he has implied authority, such as will
protect those dealing with him. But our
cases hold that a compromise is not within
the "apparent scope" of the agent's authority.
There is nothing to show when Mary
Smith had notice; but the fact that her
attorney, Win. Biddle, entered an appearance on September Ist, is sufficient to warrant an inference that he then became
cognizant of the satisfaction entered by
Jones. The knowledge of the agent so
affects the principal that she will be
deemed to have received notice at that
time. There is no evidence to show
whether she gave notice to defendant
company or not of her refusal to be bound,
but we think that her delay of two months
in bringing suit is not such an unreasonable delay as will preclude her, unless the
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rights of third parties haye intervened,
which does not appear.
For these reasons we think the rule
should be granted, and the satisfaction
stricken from the record. So ordered.
L. FLOYD HESS, J.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
The compromise
between William
Jones, attorney for Mary Smith, and the
defendant, resulted in the payment of
$1,000 by the defendant, and the entry of
a settlement of the suit upon the record.
This settlement the court has struck off,
and the result of a trial has been to find a
verdict for the plaintiff for $4,000. The
error assigned here is, that the settlement
should have been regarded by the court as
conclusive. The learned court declined
thus to regard it. Were they in error?
Two reasons for disregarding it were alleged in the court below. It was alleged
(1) that the authority of the attorney who
made it, had at the time of making it
been withdrawn, and (2) that had it not
been withdrawn it neverwas wideenough
to embrace the making of such a settlement. The last of these reasons we shall
consider first.
1. The principle is very well established
that the mere relation of attorney and
client does not confer on the former the
power to surrender any portion of what is
claimed by the latter, by way of compromise. Isaacs v. Zugsmith, 103 Pa. 77;
Brockley v. Brockley, 122 Pa. 1; Mackey
v. Adair, 99 Pa. 143. Says Trunkey, J.,
"Persons dealing with an attorney-at-law
respecting his client's business may justly
infer that he has all the power implied by
the relation, but notthathe has thepowers
of a general agent to compromise and release debts or transfer and convey the
goods or lands of his client." 103 Pa. 77.
The doctrine is correctly stated in P. & L.
Dig. of Decisions thus, "An attorneyat-law has no power to compromise the
claim of his client without special authority from the client for that purpose, and a
compromise effected without such authority is void." 2 P. &. L. Dig. 1,783. Cf.
Houseneck v. Miller, 93 Pa. 514; North
Whitehall Township v. Keller, 100Pa. 105;
Phila. & R. R. R. v. Christman, 4 Penny
271.

The plaintiff, so far as it appears, was in
the neighborhood and could easily have
been consulted. There was no cause for
haste. Jones was employed to bring the
suit. It was no part of his employment to
agree on a sum, payment of which should
discharge the Railroad Company. The
learned judges of the Common Pleas
rightly concluded that the compromise was
void, and could be repudiated by Mary
Smith, even had Jones' authority not been
revoked.
2 Had it been one of the ordinary
powers of an attorney-at-law to compromise the suit, we think the defendant
would have been justified in effecting the
compromise with Jones. He had been
employed as aftorney, and as such, had
appeared in the suit of record. How
many steps in the action had been taken
when, on May 1st, he was disdharged by
the plaintiff does not appear. The discharge was not noted on the record, and
the succeeding attorney, Wm. Biddle, did
not mark his name to the record until
Sept. 1st; four months after Jones' discharge. The compromise was made midway between these two dates. The defendant would then reasonably assume, as
he in fact did assume, the continuance of
Jones' authority, and, had the power to
compromise been one of the powers of an
attorney, could reasonably suppose the
compromise he was making was binding
on the plaintiff and himself. It fails to
be thus binding, not because of the revocation of Jones' authority, but because his
original appointment did not confer on
him the power to make it.
A subordinate question is, concerning
the right of the defendant to set-off the
$1,000 already paid by it to Jones, against
the damages found bythejury. This right
has been denied by the learned court below. The reason assigned by Judge
Lightner is, we think, satisfactory. Jones
was, when the payment was made, agent
to prosecute the action to verdict and judgment, but not to receive any money in anticipating payment, in part or in whole,
of such judgment as might be recovered.
Still less was he agent to receive a sum of
money as a consideration for discontinuing
or settling the suit. Had it been within
the actual or even the apparent scope of
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Jones' power to receive thp $1,000 for the
client, the payment of that sum would be
a good payment, despite his secret supersedure. But it never was in his power to
receive such a payment. The payment
cannot, therefore, affect Mary Smith.
The defendant must look to Jones for the
money.
It is suggested by the learned counsel
for the appellant, that the long delay in
moving the court to strike off the settlement, should preclude a repudiation of it.
The settlement was made on July 1st, 1895.
Win. Biddle, Esq., appeared to the record
Sept. 1st, and on Nov. 1st, four months
after it was made, moved the court to
strike off the settlement. It does not appear that during these four monthp, the
defendant has taken any steps which it
would not have taken, had it not relied on
the finalty of the settlement. We cannot
see that the lapse of so short a time should
of itself estop or prevent the plaintiff from
proceeding with the action to verdict and
judgment.
Judgment affirmed.

HENRY APPLETON vs. JOHN
JONES.
Ante-nuptial contract impairingstatus of
parties under marriage compact-Desertion-Husband's liability for wife's
expenses after desertion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Prior to the contract of John Jones with
Susanna Appleton to marry her, a minor,
he agrees with her and her parents that
he and she, if married, shall reside with
the latter, and the survivor of them, so long
as he or she, the survivor, shall live, and
that he will not take up any other abode,
and insist on his wife forsaking her parents, and living there with him, during
either parent's life. She relying on this
agreement, the contract to marry was
made, and in due time the marriage was
accomplished. John Jones and Susanna,
his wife, continued to live with her parents for about one year, during Which a
son was born to them.
John Jones not having lived harmoniously with the parents of the wife, then
withdraws from their residence and takes
up another, to which he invites his wife
to come with the child. She declines to

follow him, insisting on her right under
the agreement to abide with her parents,
and retains the child. During the residence with the wife's parents John Jones
had, while she was in infirm health,
neglected to provide a servant, though
financially able to do so, and insisted that
his wife should attend to the cooking and
other household duties in person. He was
also at times irascible, addressing her
with harshness and asperity. He also at
times behaved towards her parents with
indignity and insult, but did notput hands
on them or use violence of any sort, nor
threaten violence.
The wife refusing to follow him, John
Jones not being asked to supply her, in
fact supplies her neither with money nor
goods for the support of herself or child,
but they are fed, clothed and furnished
with medical attendance and board by her
parents for the space of two years after his
withdrawal from their house, with no
other request from him than sueh as the
law would imply, if any, from the circumstances stated.
During this time they expend $40 for
clothing (a reasonable amount), and $20
for the child's clothing (a reasonable
amount), $5 for medical attendance to
wife, 3 medical attendance to child, and
$3 per week for food of wife and $1.50 per
week for the support of the child (these
amounts being reasonable). A fair compensation for lodging the wife would be
$150 and an equal sum for the child. Assumpsit by the father for the money so
expended for his daughter and grandson,
and for compensation for their lodging
against John Jones.
SHAFFER and WARNER for the plaintiff.
1. A husband living separate from his
wife is bound to provide her and his children with necessaries. Kimball v. Keyes,
11 Wend. 34; Snover v. Blair, 25 N. J. L.
94; Fitler v. Fitler, 33 Pa. 50.
2. The articles furnished were necessaries. Lamson v. Varnum. 171 Mass. 237;
Mohney v. Evans, 51 Pa. 80.
LAVENS and LEE for the defendant.

1. It is against the policy of the law
that the stalims of the parties under a marriage contract should be impaired by antenuptial contract. Powell v. Powell, 29
Vt. 148; Barnett v. Kininmel, 35 Pa. 13 ;
Franklin v. Franklin, 154 Mass. 515; Am.
& Eng. Zncyc., Vol. 14, p. 539.
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2. The acts of wife in refusing to follow
husband constitute desertion, and she is
liable for her own expenses, as well as
those of the child she retained.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

I. Although it has been conceded that
a husband cannot compel his wife to reside in a place where her health would be
in danger (for that would be cruelty), or
to follow him to a foreign land-Bishop v.
Bishop, 30 Pa. 412, or to live with his relatives-Powell v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148, the
general rule is well settled that the husband has the right to aecide where the
family residence shall be, and to change it
as often as pleasure, business or health
dictates, and that the wife must follow
him or be chargeable with desertion. Cutler v. Cutler, 2 Brewst. 511; Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 380; Boyce v. Boyce, 23 N.
J. Eq. 337., This rule has its foundation
in sound public policy, and we are of the
opinion that an ante-huptial agreement
by which the husband surrenders his right
to fix and to change the domicile, should
not be enforced. The precise question
does not appear to have arisen in this
State, but in the South Carolina ease of
Hair v. Hair, 10 Pick. Eq. 163, the court
says: "Such a promise is a nullity. The
contract of matrimony has its well understood and its well defined legal duties, and
it is not competent for the parties to interpolate into the marriage compact any
condition in abridgment of the husband's
lawful authority over her person or his
claim to her obedience."
II. Without regard to the ante-nuptial
agreement, was the wife justified by her
husband's treatment of her in refusing to
follow him to his new abode? It has
been determined that the "reasonable
cause" which justifies a wife's desertion
and abandonment of her husband must
be such as would entitle her to a divorce.
Eshbach v. Eshbach, 23 Pa. 343. By the
provisions of our statute a wife is entitled
to a divorce when her husband "shall
have by cruel and barbarous treatment
endangered the wife's life, or offered such
indignities to her person as to render her

condition intolerable and life burdensome,
and thereby forces her to withdraw from
his house and family." Act of 1815, March
13, P. & L. Dig., Vol. 1, c. 1633. And in
the interprepation of this clause of the
statute, it has been declared that there
must be actual personal violence or the
reasonable apprehension of it, or such a
course of treatment as endangers her life
or health, and renders cohabitation unsafe-Detrick's Appeal, 117 Pa. 452; May
v. May, 62 Pa. 206; Gordon v. Gordon, 48
Pa. 226; and moreover, that a single act of
cruelty is not sufficient. Richards v.
Richards, 37 Pa. 225.
In the case at bar it appears that the
husband was sometimes harsh to his wife,
and that he likewise behaved in an insultiug manner toward her parents, and
that though the wife was in infirm health,
he neglected and refused to employ a servant. Clearly, these facts alone do not
show cruel and barbarous treatment as defined in the statute and cases cited. He
never so far as threatened violence to his
wife's person, and the most serious of the
charges against him is that of neglecting
to employ a servant, though able to do
so. There is no evidence, however, as to
thenature of the wife's infirmity of health,
or the extent of the household duties she
was compelled to perform, and we are
therefore unable to say, as a matter of lawthat compelling her to do her own housework endangered her health to such a degree as to render cohabitation under the
circumstances unsafe. That such at least
was not the cause of her refusal to cohabit
is indicated by her apparent willingness
to live with him in her parents' house.
For the reasons stated, the wife's refusal
to follow her husband must he regarded as
a desertion, and it follows that the husband is not liable for necessaries subsequently furnished her by her parents.
Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247, 250;
Walter v. Simpson, 7 W. &. S.83; Breinig
v. Meitzler, 23 Pa. 156. The same is true
of necessaries for the infant child retained
by the wife. Fitler v. Fitler, 33 Pa. 50.
Judgment for defendant.

THE FORUM.
ARTHUR MANUFACTURING CO.
vs. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Attachment-M1unicipal corporationsGarnishee.

COMMONWEALTH vs. BURT &
PACKARD.
Constitutionalityof semi-monthly pay law,
Act of May 20, 1891, P. L. 96.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On February 1st, 1898, Samuel Smiley
received the contract for the building of a
sewer system from the borough of Carlisle.
The sum to be paid was $10,000. The
work was finished on December 1st, 1899,
and accepted by the borough. But $8,000
has been paid to Smiley, and $2,000 is still
due. Smiley purchased certain pipe from
the plaintiff for $1,000. This bill he refuses to pay, though judgment has been
obtained against him. The Arthur Manufacturing Company has attached the
money in the hands of the borough due
Smiley.
BASEHORE and HEIST for the plaintiff.
1. Money owing under every description of contractual obligation is subject to
attachment. In re. Glen Iron Works, 13
W. N. (3. 388; 1 P. & L. Dig. 403.
2. A borough may be garnishee. Heeber v. Chave, 5 Pa. 115.
SEBRING and ALEXANDER for the defendant.
1. A municipal corporation cannot be
made a garnishee. Grier v. Rawley, 1
Pitts. 1; Phila. Granite and Blue Stone
Co. v. Douglass, 14 0. C. 244; Pettebone v.
Bardslee, 1 Kulp 180, (a county); Van
Volkenburgh v. Earley, I Kulp 216, (a
borough); Morrell v. Bank of Penna., 2
Phila. 61,(a state officer); Fairbanks Co. v.
Kirk, 22 C. C, 57 (1899).
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff has obtained a judgment
against Samuel Smiley for $1,000, and has
issued an attachment execution thereon
against the borough of Carlisle, which
owes Smiley $2,000. The borough'of Carlisle has filed a motion to quash the attachment, on the ground thatbeing a municipal corporation it cannot be garnisheed.
Such a corporation cannot be made a
garnishee in execution attachment. 1
Trickett, Liens 433.
For this reason, we think, the attachnient should be quashed. 1 Br. Practice
696.
Attachment quashed.

The defendants are the owners of a shoe
factory located in the borough of Shippensburg. It has been their custom to
pay all employes on the last Saturday of
each calendar month. The district-attorney brings this indictment for a violation of the "Semi-monthly Pay Law," of
May 20, 1891, P. L. 96.
The defendants allege the Act to be a
violation .of Art. 1, See. 17, and Art. 3, Sec.
7, of the State Constitution.
Motion to quash bill.
STAUFFER and LIGHTNER for the Cornmonwealth.
1. Art. 1, Sec. 17, of the Constitution,
does not apply for this Act does not impair the obligation of contract.
2. Art. 3, See. 7, of the Constitution,
does not apply, for there is no class legislation in the Act under consideration.
Besides, this article is to be liberally construed. Seabold v. Commissioners. 187
Pa. 318; Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa.* 213;
Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246.
MITCHELL and BOWERS for the defendant.
1. The Act is a violation of Art. 1, Sec.
17, and Art. 3, See. 7, of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania, and the bill of indictmentshould be quashed. Of. Godcharles
v. Wigeman, 112 Pa. 431; Showalter v.
Ehlan, 5 Sup. 242.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On the motion to quash the indictment
against Burt & Packard, the only cause
asigned for quashing it is the unconsti.
tutionality of the Act of May 20th, 1891,
2 P. & L. 4,801, which, it is alleged, that
the defendants have violated. The first
section of that Act enacts that "every individual firm, association or corporation
3mploying wage-workers, skilled or ordinary, laborers engaged at manual or clerical work in the business of mining or
manufacturing, or any other employes,
shall make payment in lawful money of
the United States to the said employes,
laborers and wage-workers, or to their authorized representatives, the firstpayment
to be made between the first and the fifteenth, and the second between the fifteenth and thirtieth of each month, the
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full net amount of wages or earnings due
said employes, laborers and wage-workers
upon the first and fifteenth instant of each
and every month wherein such payments
are made." Refusal to make payments
when demanded upon the dates thus set
forth is declared to be a misdemeanor, on
conviction of which a fine not exceeding
$200 may be imposed.
The defendants are indicted for refusing
to pay wages of certain employes, on their
demand, on the days mentioned in the
Act.
The Act is alleged to conflict with Art.
I,Sec. 17, and with Art. 3, Sec. 7, of the
Constitution of this State. The seventeenth section of Art. 1 declares that no
"law impairing the obligation of contracts" shall be passed. But a law forbidding a contract does not impair the obligation of a contract made in violation of
it. No law can be censurable, under this
clause of the Constitution, unless there is,
before its adoption, a contract which gives
rise to an obligation, and unless it impairs
this pre-3xlsting obligation. It does not
appear that any contract between the defendants and the employes, whose wages
they have refused to pay, existed before
the passage of the Act of 1891.
The first section of Art. 1 of the Constitution dedlares that "all men are born
equally free and independent, and have
certain indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property and reputation, and
of pursuing their own happiness." Itmay
be that by this section, a right to make
contracts, within limits, is secured as a
portion of "liberty" and as a means of
"acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property," or of "pursuing * * happiness." If this is so, there are two answers
to the suggestion that the first section of
the Act of 1691, so far as invoked by this
indictment, violates this right.
1. No contract is alleged to have been
made between the defendants and their
employes, by which the pay ment of wages
was deferred beyond two weeks. The defendants are indicted-for having refused to
pay every two weeks. Whether they have
the excuse that by their contract, they
were not required thus to pay, we do not

know. To inquire whether they have,
upon their motion to quash, would be improper. Now, the same section of an Act
might be unconstitutional, so far as its
operation would interfere with the making
and enforcing of contracts, and constitutional, in other respects. We are unable
to see that the Legislature cannot require
employers to pay wages every two weeks,
in the absence of contracts, although the
terms employed by them are wide enough
to cover cases in which there are such
contracts as well as those in which there
are none. Bolton v. Johns, 5 Pa. 145; Bunn
v. Gorgas, 41 Pa. 441.
2. But, even had it appeared that the
defendants had made a contract with their
employes, for less frequent than bi-weekly
payments, and that, consequently, to
punish them for n )t making bi-weekly
payments, would be to impugn their power
effectually to make such contracts, we are
not able to say that the Act would be unconstitutional. The power of the Legislature to prohibit or restrict the makipg
of contracts has been largely exercised
and conceded by the courts. Two adult
men contract, one to borrow, the other to
lend $1,000 at eight per cent. interest. The
Legislature has said that as respects the
two per cent. in excess of six, the contract
shall be void. What court has denounced
the law as unconstitutional? or said that
such alaw "isan insulting attempt to put
the borrower under a legislative tutelage,
which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizenof the United States." See Godcharles
v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431.
The Act of May 21st, 1855, 2 P. & L.
3,264, makes it criminal to sell oleomargarine. Why? To prevent persons buying
and consuming it. But the courts have
not found in such law any obnoxious legislative tutelage over consumer or buyer.
Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265. It
might be supposed that a man suijuris
would prefer to decide for himself whether
he should buy and eat oleomargarine.
But the Legislature has kindly supplied
him with a wisdom he lacks, and made
purchase of the obnoxious fat impossible,
and consumption of it difficult, and its
assumption of guardianship has not been
condemned.
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Men suijuriscontract occasionally with
employers to exempt the latter from liability for the negligence of their servants,
but such contracts have been pronounced
invalid by the courts. Burnett v. Pa. R.
R., 176 Pa. 45. It is difficult to see how a
court can put adult men under tutelage,
and the Legislature not.
Indeed, it is the businessof theState to exercise a tutelage over its citizens, to preserve
them from fraud, violence and oppression,
and the oppression that may be wrought
through contracts it is as much its duty
to prevent, as any other oppression. He
surely is blind to the most manifest facts
of society, who does not see that in many
contracts the parties are not equally free,
and that for the State to abandon the
weaker to the rapacity of the stronger, is
to abdicate its most solemn and imperious
duty. Consider the regulation of the sale
of bread by weights, 3 W. N. 273; of notes
given for patent rights, Hunter v. Henninger,93 Pa.373; Shiresv.Commonwealth,
120 Pa. 368; of the hours per day a conductor on a passenger car may be required to
work; Act March 24, 1887, 1 P. & L, 1,316;
of the making of contracts concerning
land, etc.
The distinction between those suijuris
and those non suijuris,is itself a legislative one. Married women have been recently transposed from one class to the
other. And it is idle to assume that all
persons of the class roughly denominated
suijurisareso provident, intelligent and independent, thht they can adequately safeguard their interests when dealing with
any other members of that class.
It is well known that the wage earners,
as a class, have little property, and depend
for their daily subsistence on the wages
that they earn. Important moral and
economic reasons require the punctual payment, at short intervals, of these wages,
and these reasons are so strong ns to override any consideration of. the desirability
of allowing absolute freedom of the weak
to contract under coercion with the strong.
As to the seventh section of Art. 3,
which the Act of 1891 is supposed to infringe, it will not be possible for us
Vide, Leonard v. Pierce, 1
to say much.
Forum 79. Though the Act of 1891 regulates "labor, trade, mining or manufactur-

ing," we do not think it "special" in the
prohibited sense. This Act applies to all
employes without distinction. It applies
to wage-workers, skilled or ordinary, laborers at manual or clerical work, in the
business of mining or manufacturing, or
any otheremployes. We are of opinion that
the Constitution does not prohibit separate classification of manufacturing and
mining business, and the making of regulations that their special peculiarities seem
to require. The needs with respect to payment of wages, etc., of the dependent
workers in mills, foundries, factories, may
be different from those of workers in other
lines, and it would be regrettable if the
Constitution should be so construed as to
prevent legislation contrived to meet these
needs.
The motion to quash is dismissed, and
the defendant is ordered to plead.
MARINE INS. CO. vs. WM. CODY.
Lunatic-Negligence- Damages-Subrogation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

James Throop owned a vessel, which
Cody chartered for a voyage from Boston
to Philadelphia. A violent storm arose,
and for two days and nights Cody, captain
of the vessel, remained on deck, not sleeping, and eating but little. Meantime he
felt himself becoming exhausted, and resorted to large doses of quinine. His mind
was affected, and his orders to the crew
resulted in the vessel running ashore and
being totally wrecked. Throop bued the
insurance company, and recovered $12,000.
Thereupon the company sued Cody, as
the cause, by his unskillful and negligent
commands, of the accident and loss. Defendant asked the court to say to the jury:
(1) No cause of action against him arose to
the plaintiff. (2) If the unskillful orders
were the resultof theexhaustion and temporary mental aberration caused by excessive watching, labors and the quinine,
the taking of which was made necessary,
he was not responsible. The court told
the jury that insanity was no excuse for
negligence or the want of skill required by
the occasion; and that the insurance con-
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pany could recover, if they found the facts
according to the testimony of the plaintiff.
SLOAN and GRAUL for the plaintiff.
1. Insane persons are liable for their
torts, except those in which malice is a
necessary ingredient. Williams v. Hays,
143 N. Y. 442.
2. The insurance company, having paid
the charterer, is subrogated to his right of
action against Cody. Monticello v. Mollison, 17 How. 153; Mobile, etc., R. R. Co.
v. Jurey, 111 U. S. 594.
RALSTON and BURCHENAL for the de-

fendant.
1. Cody cannot be held liable, for there
is no negligence if a man uses ordinary
care.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action brought by the Marine
Ins. Co. against Win. Cody to recover
damages for the wrecking of a ship, due
to his alleged negligence.
Cody chartered a vessel, and took her
out of Boston, as captain, intending to run
her to Philadelphia. A violent storm
arose, and for two days and nights Cody
was constantly on duty. In the meantime he had taken large doses of quinine.
His mind was affected, and his orders to
the crew resulted in running the vessel
ashore and completely wrecking her.
The question for us to decide is whether
the insanity of the defendant furnishes a
defense to the plaintiff's claim, and it is
the opinion of the court that it does not.
The general rule is that an insane person
s just as responsible for his torts as a sane
person, with the exception of those torts
of which malice is an ingredient. The
law looks to a person who has been damaged, and endeavors to make him whole;
and the liability of a lunatic for his torts
has been placed on several grounds. First,
that when one of two innocent persons
bears a loss, he must bear it whose acts
caused it. Again, it is said that public
policy requires the enforcement of the liability; that the relatives of the lunatic
may be under inducement to restrain him,
and that tort-feasors may not simulate or
pretend insanity to defend their wrongful
acts causing damage to others. In Bushwell on Insanity (355) it is said, "Since in
a civil action for tort it is not necessary to
aver or prove any wrongful intent on the
part of the defendant, it is a rule of common law that although a lunatic may tot

be punished criminally, he is liable in a
civil action for any tort he may commit:"
In Cooley on Torts (9S) the learned
author says: "A wrong is an invasion of a
right to the damage of the party who
suffers it. It consists in the injury done,
and not commonly in the purpose or mental condition of the person or agent doing it."
The law, in giving redress, has in view
the case of the party injured, and the extent of his injury, and makes what he
suffers the measure of compensation.
In 143 N. Y. 442, which seems to -be an
analogous case, it is held that an insane
person is liable for his torts the same as a
sane person, except for those torts in which
malice, and therefore intention, is a necessary ingredient.
The conclusion of the court, therefore,
is that judgment be for the plaintiff.
WALT. TAYLOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff has paid $12,000 to Throop,
the owner of the vessel. Alleging that
the vessel was lost by the unskillful and
careless action of Cody, its captain, the
company brings this action to recover from
Cody the $12,000.
That the company has a right to subrogation to the position of Throop as against
Cody, is incontestable. Williams v. Hays,
143 N. Y. 442; 2 May, Insurance, 1030.
But, had Throop any right to recover
from Cody compensation for the loss of
the vessel on the facts disclosed in this
case? The defendant requested the trial
court to tell the jury that there was shown
no right to recover; and, more .pecifically,
that if the unskillful orders of Cody were
the result of the exhaustion and temporary
mental dberration caused by excessive
watching, labor and quinine, the taking
of which was made necessary, Cody was
not responsible, In declining these instructions, was the court in error?
Assuming that the commands of Cody,
obedience to which resulted in the wreck
of the vessel, were not such as a comipetently skillful man would have given under the circumstances, we are to ascertain
the causes of the incompetence that
prompted them. It is not shown that
Cody had been deficient in a sailor's skill
and knowledge. An unusual storm had
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arisen. He was obliged to remain on
deck, without sleep, for two days and
nights, eating but little. There was nothing improper in this. He not only had a
right, but apparently was under a duty
thus to exert himself for the safety of the
ship.

Exhaustion supervening, Cody re-

.-orted to large doses of quinine. He was
not culpably responsible for the exhaustion. There is no evidence that he
was careless or reckless in the use of the
quinine. He took that drug. So had millions before him. He took it in large
doses. But in how large? In five-grain,
ten-gi'ain, fifteen-grain doses? How often
did he repeat them? Would a prudent
man, under the circumstances, have refrained from taking'them? The evidence
is insufficient to justify an affirmative response.
The situation, then, is this: A violent
storm requires and justifies such exertions
of Cody as prostrated him. Exhausted,
he not imprudently takes quinine. The
u nforeseen and unforeseeable effect of the
exhaustion and the quinine is the loss of
sane judgment and skill Of this loss the
shipwreck is the consequence. For which
of the series of causes is Cody responsible ?
Not for the storm, surely. Nor for the
watching which it made obligatory on
him. Nor for the exhaustion that, without his prevision of it, followed. Nor for
the taking of the quinine, which, so far as
appears, prudence and regard for his responsibilities dictated. But the loss of
consciousness of the situation of the ship,
and of apprehension of the maneuvers
needful to rescue it from peril, was the
unexpected and, so far as appears, the unexpectable result. We are unable to say
that Cody is responsible pecuniarily for
the effects of this want of consciousness
and of apprehension. Williams v. Hays,
157 N. Y. 541.
What the liability of an insane man is
generally for his torts is perhaps not quite
clear. He is assumed to be liable for torts,
by Gibson, C. J., in Beale v. See, 10 Pa.
56; and, inter alia,for negligence-Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442. But see 16

Am.. & Eng. Encyc. 410, which combats
the doctrine of the possibility of a lunatic,
or insane person being negligent. Several
Pennsylvania cases hold that a person may
be so immature from youth as to be incapable of care, and that there can be no
negligence on the part of those incapable
of care. If this i so, the idiot, lunatic or
maniac being also incapable of care, would
be incapable of negligence. It is, indeed,
difficult to see how Cody could be accused
of negligence, in any just sense of that
word, when in the condition in which he
is described by the evidence to have been.
Feeling the difficulty of imputing negligence to a child, or a lunatic or insane
man, some judges have attempted to find
another ground of their liability for a mischief to the person or property of another,
emanating from them. Says Gibson, C.
J.: The insane man "is liable to bear the
consequences of his infirmity as he is liable to bear his misfortunes, on ' the principle that wherealoss must be borne by one
of two innocent persons, it shall be borne
by him who occasioned it." But what is
it to "occasion" a hurt or injury? A
child of four years runs into an old man,
and throws him down. Has he "occasioned" the hurt? One in sudden peril
wards off a blow from a missile, and causes
it to strike another. Has he "occasioned"
the blow? A throws the body of B against
that of C. Is B the occasion of C's fall?
Surely the fact that some act or motion of
A's body is in the chain of causation of a
hurt to B, does not ipso facto make A responsible. Beside the causal relation, we
search for some other element. Was there
intention?
Was there malice?
Was
there negligence? But it is unnecessary
to decide whether Cody could be actionable had his unskillful acts emanated from
an insanity that existed independently of
his efforts to perform his duty as captain.
The evidence before the jury justified it in
inferring that his insanity was the result
of his strenuous endeavor to save the vessel. The court should, we think, have
affirmed the defendant's second point.
Judgment reversed.
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SAMUEL MAPES vs. HENRY WILE.

CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury.The case for your consideration is in
substance as follows: Samuel Mapes, to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
be hereafter known as the plaintiff, entered into a written contract with Henry
Mapes, owning a flour mill, contracted
iii writing to sell it to Wile for $10,000,
Wile, to be hereafter known as the deorally guaranteeing its capacity to produce
fendant, whereby the plaintiff agreed to
40 bbls. of flour per day. Wile paid $3,000
convey to the defendant, for a consideration of $10.000, a certain flour mill, orally
and possession was given to him, but no
deed was delivered. After he had oper- guaranteeing its capacity was 40 bbls. per
ated the mill a short time he discovered it
day. Wile paid $3,000 of the purchase
would not produce more than 10 bbls. of money and received possession of the-property. After operating itawhile he discovflour per day. He undertook therefore to
ered that the capacity was but 10 bbls. per
change its machinery and power so that it
day. Wile therefore undertook to chnnge
would produce 40 bbls. per day, and in
its machinery and power so that it would
doing so spent $8,000, and consequently
produc: 40 bbls. per day, and in so doing
refused to pay any more purchase money
spent $8,000, and consequently refused to
to Mapes or to yield up the possession.
Mapes then brought ejectment. Mapes pay any more of the purchase money, nor
agreed to reduce the purchase price from
would he give up the possession of the
S7,0J0 to $3,500, on claim that had the property. Mapes now brings this action
mill been only of capacity to produce 10
of ejectment.
bbls. per day it would have been worth
Mapes now agrees to reduce the balance
of the purchase money which is S7.000 to
$7,000 at least.
SHIPMAN and LIGHTNER for the plain- $',500, on theclaim that had the mill been
only of the capacity of'10 bbls. per day it
tiff
1. Ejeetment by vendor lies against
would in the least be worth $7,000.
vendee when part of the purchase money
The 2ounsel for the defendant allege
has been paid and vendee has defaulted in
that
their client was induced to enter into
payment of'remainder. Walker v. France,
this contract by fraud and that the plain112 Pa. 203; Brown v. Dewitt, 131 Pa. 455;
Daubert v. Pa. R. R., 155 Pa. 178; Moyer
tiff should bear the burden. We think
v. Garrett, 96 Pa. 376.
that this point must be negatived. No
2. For breach of a warranty the purchaser's measure of damages is the differ- person can be held responsible for a inis
ence between the actual value of the sub- representation made through an honest
ject of sale and the value it would have
mistake. Fisher v. Mullen, 103 Mass. L03.
had at the time of the sale, if it had corThere is no evidence nor is there any
responded with the warranty. Beaupland
allegation
on the part of the defendant
v. McKeer. 28 Pa. 124; Walker v. France,
that the mill never was capable of produc112 Pa. 203; City Iron Works v. Barber,
ing 40 bbls. per day, and that by judicious
102 Pa. 156; Himes v. Kiehl, 154 Pa. 190.
repairing it could have been put in condiHEss and LENTZ for the defendant.
tion where it would have been capable of
1. This is an equitable ejectment for a
balance of purchase money and the de- doing the same again.
fendant has the right (a) To set offany
Counsel for the defense claim that they
ulamageshe may have suffered from breach
have suffered $8,000 damage by reason of
jf plaintiff's warranties.
Walker v.
France, 112 Pa. 203. (b) To have the the mill's non-fulfillment of Mapes' guarcourt decree that'a deed be made upon anfee. In this we cannot concur. By
payment of balance less such damages as looking into the agreement it at once bemay be awarded. Mitchell v. De Roche,
comes apparent that Mapes did not conI Yeates 12; Brown v. Dewitt, 13 Pa. 453.
2. The measure of damages is the differ- template giving a mill equal in value to
ence between the value of the property at
one having all new machinery.
the time of the sale capable of producing
The same mill with old machinery, pro10 bbls. per day and the value it would
ducing 40 bbls. per day, would be worth a
have had if capable of producing 40 bbls.
good deal less than if it had new machinWalker v. France, 112 Pa, 203; Wilkinson
v. Ferris, 24 Pa. 190.
ery of the same capacity. It therefore beEquitable ejectment- Warranty-Set offMeasure of damages.
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comes necessary for you to derive the
measure of damages by a different computation.
We are of the opinion that the doctrine
laid down in Walker v. France, 112 Pa.
203, is admirably adapted to the settlenient of this case. In the case just cited
the learned court holds that in an equitable action of ejeetment brought by the
vendor to recover the balance of purchase
money due upon a contract, the vendee
will be permitted to recoup the damages
sustained by reason of the vendor's inability to comply with his contract.
It is well settled that equity will decree
specific performance of a contract when it
has already been so far performed, that it
would be inequitable to rescind the same.
Such are the circumstances here; the parties cannot be placed in static quo without
doing an injustice to one or the other;
hence the only way open for you is to find
the measure of damages to which the defendant is entitled as a set-off against the
$7,000 still due.
If Mr. Wile had spent the $8,000 in repairs so as to bring the mill up to the
guarantee, it is clear that -he would have
been entitled to that amount as a set-off,
but we do not think that he was justified
in throwing out the old machinery and
changing it for new, such as would suit
his whim or fancy. If the ruling were
diffbrent, praise of one's own property
would be unsafe. If the property did not
conform with the letter of the guarantee,
the vendee could throw out the old machinery and put in new, nickel or silverplated, of the same capacity, but which
would cost more than the vendor's original price and thus the vendor would get
nothin g for his property.
Now, gentlemen of the jury, the question for you to decide is the difference in
value of two mill properties whose location are identical, whose buildings are
identical, but whose productive powers
vary by 30 bbls. a day. The mill submitted to your consideration is one which was
represented to produce 40 bbls. a day.
There has been no evidence submitted
that this was not its original capacity,
which must have been some ',ine ago, as
evidenced by the fact that the defendant
discarded the machinery as of no more

service. However this mill was still capable of producing 10 bbls. per day.
Now it is for you to say what is the difference in value between the mill as represented and as it now is. Take then all
the evidence submitted to you with these
instructions, give it your careful consideration and return a verdict, such as you
think does justice between the two litigants.
The decree of the court is that whatever
this verdict may be, if reasonable, shall be
the defendsnt's set-off against the 57,000
still due, and judgment will be entered
thereon against Wile to remain in full
force and effect until satisfied.
W. B. GERY, P. J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff in this case brings ejectment to recover possession of the mill
which had been the subject of a contract
of sale between the defendant and himself.
The plaintiff had orally guaranteed the
productive capacity of the mill at 40 bbls.
per day. On going into possession, however, the defendant found that the manufactory was capable of turning out but 10
bbls. per day, and in consequence of the
breach of warranty by plaintiff, defendant
took it upon himself to improve the mill
to such an extent as to bring it up to the
plaintiff's warranty. In so doing defendant expended 58,000 and since he had
already paid $3,000 of thepurchase money,
he refuses to surrender possession on the
ground that he has already expended
more than the contract price of the mill,
to-wit, $10,000.
Had the defendant paid the full purchase money instead of but a portion of it,
lie undoubtedly, as defendant claims,
could have successfully defended the action of ejectment and compelled the plaintill to deliver a deed to him. Here, however, the defendant had not paid the full
purchase price, and could not therefore
demand a deed or retain possession.
Mitchell's lessee v. De Roche, 1 Yeates 12,
was a case of ejectment by the vendor of
land against the vendee who was in possession. The contract stipulated that the
purchase money was to be paid in installments, and in pursuance thereof part of
the purchase money (the first installment)
was duly paid. The plaintiff; on the re-
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fusal of the defendant to pay the balance,
brought ejeetment, and the court say,
"Without payment of the full consideration money the defendant is not entitled
to the premises on any principle of law or
equity." This same principle is also laid
down by the court in Marlin v. Willink,
7 S. & R. 297.
The learned counsel for the defendant
contend, however, that the plaintiff here
cannot recover in ejectment for the reason
that in order to do so he must set up his
own fraud. This point we also feel constrained to negative from the fact that
nothing appears in the statement of facts
sufficient to warrant us in presuming the
existence of a fraud, especially as the law
ever presumes against crime and fraud
whenever it can possibly do so consistently with the statement of facts.
The defendant in the case at bar endeavors to use as a set-off the amount of
money he has expended in bringing the
mill up to the productive capacity guaranteed by the plaintiff. That a right of
set-off' for valuable improvements exists,
there can beno doubt. Walker v. France,
112 Pa. 203. The defendant, however, is
not to be allowed to set off the amount he
chose to expend in bringing the productive
capacity up to the warranty, but what the
expense incident to improving the mill
up to the guaranteed capacity actually
was. This amount is made the subject of
contention in this case, the defendant contending that it was $8,000, the amount he
expended, and the plaintiff, on the other
hand, claiming that the value of the mill
at even 10 bbls. per day was $7,000, or
$6,500 at least, and therefore the difference in value of the mill as guaranteed
and as actually delivered was but $3,000,
although lie is willing, in order to settle
the case, to accept but $6,500 for it. Strange
to say, however, although the plaintiff
claims that $3,000 was sufficient to bring
the mill up to the warranty, and the defendant contends that it was necessary to
expend 58,000 in so doing, yet neither
party has adduced any evidence to support his contention on this point, but
merely advances his own statements as to
what liethinks was the necessary outlay.
Although this being a court of equity, the
court has power to decide questions of

fact as well as of law, yet in this case we
are at an utter loss to determine the difference between the pecuniary values of the
mill as guaranteed and as it was actually
delivered, for the reason above given, that
the parties differ as to the amount, but
neither adduces any evidence in substantiation of his assertions.
We think, therefore, that as the defendant wishes to make a set-off for improvements he has made, the burden of proof
rests upon him to establish affirmatively
the amount mentioned above before lie is
entitled to such set-off. Since he has
failed to do this, we must consider as such
difference in the value of the mill as guaranteed and as delivered the amount conceded by the plaintiff, to-wit, $3,500.
As a condition precedent to the recovery
of the mill, however, the plaintifrmnust
refund that amount of the purchase money
already paid by the defendant. Walker
v. France, 112 Pa. 203.
Therefore, unless the counsel for the defendant, in accordance with the rules of
equity, moves for a postponement or a continuance, we will be obliged to enter judgnuent for the plaintiff to recover the property in question on condition, however, of
his re-paying to the defendant the $3,000
purchase money already received by him
and the $3,500 conceded by the plaintiff to
be the difbrence between the value of the
mill as it was guaranteed by him and its
value as it actually was when delivered to
HII. HARPEL, J.
the defendant.
AMOS CUMMINGS

vs.

RAILROAD

COMPANY.
Common cw'ri',--isscng'r-]atonabh'
regulation.
STATE-MENT OF TiE CASE.

Plaintiff intending to go to Philadelphia
over the defendant's railroad, went to the
station at 9 I'. ir. in order to take the I I i'.
Mr. train. He entered the station and purchased a ticket. In a few minutes thd
agent told him that he must close' the
stationi, as it vas a rule of the coniaiy
that it should be kept open only thirty
minutes betbre the train left. 1Plailiff
protested that lie had nowhere to go,.but
He
the agent threatened to eject him.
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went outside and waited. The night was
bad. Plaintiff was thinly clad, and, as a
result, contracted a severe illness. This
action is brought to recover damages.
DEAL and ELDER for the plaintiff.
I. Plaintiff was a passenger (Dodge v.
ISteamship Co., 148 Mass. 207,) and therefore entitled to protection from injury and
to shelter. Grimes v. Pennsylvania Co.,
•6 Fed. 72; Gordon v. R. R. Co., 40 Barb.
546.
2. Theregdlation .wasunreasonable, and
therefore the company is liable for injury
resulting from its enforcement by agents.
Pa. R R. Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa:21; Lent
v. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 467.
FRANTZ and DAvis for the defendant.
1. The regulation was reasonable.
2. The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and therefore cannot
recover. Aspell v. R. R. Co., 23 Pa. 147;
'4ehofield v. Chicago R. R. Co., 8 Fed.
Rep. 488; Kennard v. N. J. R. R. Co., 21
Pa. 205.

The right of a railroad company to make
reasonable rules and regulations for its
own protection, and for the safety and convenience of its passengers, has been recognized by our courts. Pennsylvania Ry.
Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa. 27; Commonwealth
v. Power, 48 Mass. 596. As the plaintiff
had, by the purohase of a ticket with the
intention of goingon the next train for
Philadelphia, established the relation of
passenger and carrier-Dodge v. Boston
Steamship .Co., 148 Mass. 207, we have only
to consider the reasonableness of rules applicable to passengers as distinguished
from those relative to mere licensees.
The.doctrine of our courts is, that a railroad company is bound to omit no precaution that would conduce to the safety
and protection of its passengers. New
Jersey Ry. Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. 204.
Applying this rule, we think the defendOPINION OF THE COURT.
ant is liable for refusing to use that degree
The plaintiff, intending to go to Phila- of care necessary for the protection of its
adelphia over the defendant's road, went
passengers. As was said in Harris v.
to the station at 9 o'cloek in the evening
Stevens, 31 Vt. 88, " Any person who dein order to take the 11 o'clock train. He
sires to go up.on the cars has the right in a
purchased a ticket, and was subsequently
proppr manner, and at a suitable time, to
told by the agent to leave, as the r~ule of go upon the premises of the company at
the company necessitated his closing the any station where the passenger trains
building until one-half hour before the stop to receive passengers for the purpose
train started. Plaintiff protested that he
of procuring a ticket and getting oil board,
bad nowhere to go, but the agent threat- and the company has no right to prevent
ening to eject him, he went outside and
or hinder his coming on their premises,
waited. The night was bad. Plaintiff or to order him to depart therefrom, before
was thinly clad, and, as a result, conthe departure of the train ; and such pertracted a severe illness. He now brings
son has the right to remain on the premthis action to recover damages.
ises of the company at such station until
The case, we think, involves two points:
the departure of the train."
(1) Is the reasonableness of the regulation
The application must be made in a
requiring the building to be closed until
proper manner, and at a suitable time.
thirty minutes before the train started a
What constitutes a suitable time must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances
question of law for the court, or of fact for
the jury ? (2) Was the regulation a reasonof each case. The rule regarding the closable one?
ing of a station, which is applicable to a
When the facts are undisputed, the
city depot, is certainly not applicable to a
reasonableness of the rule is a question of
small town in a rural district. From the
law for the court. If it were otherwise,
statement of facts, it appears that there
there would be no uniformity as to what
was no public -place for accommodations
constituted a reasonable rule, one jury
in the neighborhood of the station, hence,
holding that a rule was reasonable, while
a rule compelling a person wishing to beanother jury might decide the same rule
come a passenger to remain outside of the
to be unreasonable. Pittsburg Ry. Co. v.
building until thirty minutes prior to the
Lyon, 123 Pa. 140; Louisville Ry. Co. v.
starting of the train would certainly work
Fleming, 18 Am. & Rng. Ry. Cases 356;
many hardships upon the patrons of the
Veddor v. Fellows, 2Q N. Y. 126.
road. Duringthe Winter months it would
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necessitate persons living at a distance
from the station to make no allowance for
mishaps when contemplating making
connection with a certain scheduled train,
lest in so doing they would be compelled
to subject themselves to exposure should
they arrive without accident.
The authorities seem to hold that a rule
which arbitrarily and unnecessarily subjects the passengers to inconvenience, annoyance. loss and delay is unreasonable.
Pittsburg Hy. Co. v. Lyon, supra; Veddor v. Fellows, supra; Summitt v. State,
9 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cases 302; Commonwealth v. Power, supra; Hall v. Power,
53 Mass. 482. Relative to stations, Campbell, J., in People v. McKay, 46 Mich.
440, says: "Passengers are entitled to remain in the station so long as they have
occasion to do so and commit no offense
against the good order of the place." Ap)lying the doctrine of these cases to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the regulation of the defendant company is an unreasonable one.
This being our interpretation of the law,
it is your duty, gentlemen of the jury, to
find for the plaintiff the amount of damages to be assessed by you in your verdict.
H. M. COLLINS, J.
This is an action to recover damages for
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, Amos
Cummings, against the railroad company
for being expelled from its station, to
which he had gone about 9 o'clock, intending to take the 11 o'clock train for
Philadelphia.
After arriving at the station he bought
a ticket for Philadelphia, expecting to remain in the station until the time for the
departure of his train. But he was informed by the station agent thathe would
have to leave the station, as the company
allowed its stations to remain open but
thirty minutes before the departure of its
trains.
The plaintiff remonstrated against this,
claiming that he had no place to go, but
he was nevertheless obliged to leave the
station, and, being thinly clad, contracted
a scrious illness from being exposed to the
inclement weather. For the injuries suffered he brings this action.
As soon as the plaintiff arrived at the

station he purchased a tickot from the
agent. By so doing did the railroad assume the duties of a carrier of passengers
towards him, and did he bind himself to
live up to.all the reasonable rules and regulations of the company?
The purchase of a ticket by a person, entitling him to travel between two stations,
creates the relation of carrier and passenger, with all the duties imposed by law
upon each. Wabash R. Co. v. Rector, 9
Am. & Eg. R. Cases 264. It is not even
necessary that the person should have a
ticket. Going into the station, ticket office
or waiting room with the bona fide intention of becoming a passenger, ordinarily
places one in the position of a passenger.
Donovan v. Hartford St. R. Co., 65 Conn.
201. Also, a person who has purchased a
ticket, and is in the waiting room of the
company intending to take a train, is a
passenger. Carpenter v. Boston R. Co.,
21 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 331.
After a careful consideration of the cas.es
upon this sulject we are of the opinion
that the relation of passenger and carrier
existed between Cummings and the railroad company; therefore, the company
was bound to see that the plaintiff was
not injured on account of any neglect on
their part.
So, also, the plaintiff was bound to conform to all the reasonable rules and regulations of the company.
This leaves usfreeto determine whether
the regulation of the company allowing
the station to remain open but thirty
minutes before the departure of trains was
a reasonable one. If the rule was reasonable, then the plaintiff cannot recover for
any damages suffered, while, if not, he
can.
It is a well established rule of law, that
railroad companies have the right to adopt
such reasonable rules and regulations for
the management of their business as they
deem proper. Langdon v. Pa. R. R. Co.,
92 Pa. 21. But at the same time they must
see that no unjust methods are employed
in the carrying on of their business.
After sellingi to the plaintiff a ticket,
was it proper for the defendant to exclude
Cummings fiom their waiting room ?
This all depends upon the fact whether
the regulation of allowing their station to
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be open but thirty minutes before the departure of trains was a reasonable one.
When the facts upon which the reasonableness or unreasonableness of aregulation
of a railroad company depend are undislputed, then the determiningas to whether
the regulation is a reasonable one is a
question of law for the court. Pittsburg,
C. and St. L. R. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140 ;
Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126-13L The
facts being undisputed in this case, we
think it .s within the province of the court
to determine the reasonableness of the rule.
Two hours before the time for the arrival
of the train which the plaintiff expected
to take for Philadelphia, the defendant
company sold him aticket to that city.
After receiving his ticket he expected to
remain in the waiting room until his train
arrived, but he was expelled from the station. The plaintiff claimed that he had
no place to go in order to be protected from
the weather, which was on that night
bad.
Could the company, under such conditions, expel one of its passengers from its
waiting room?
A regulation of this nature would cause
great inconvenience to the passengers of
any railroad company. The traveling
public, as a general rule, are not residents
of the town in which the station is situated, especially in a town into which
several different railroads run. Passengers come into the town on one road expecting to go out on another, and not
knowing the time of the departure of the
trains of the other roads, are oftentimes
compelled to remain in the town for hours.
Under such circumstances some people,
especially those of means, could go to a
hotel, while others less fortunate in a
financial way could not afford to do so.
But carriers of passengers must provide
accommodations for all classes of persons,
poor as well as rich.
Therefore, after duly reflectingupon the
rights of the relative parties, we are of the
opinion that the regulation in this case,
circumstances being such as they are, is
an unreasonable one, and that the requiring of the plaintiff to expose himself to
th&weather, and the denying to him of
the use of its station, was a breach of the
duty which the carrier owed to the plain-

tiff. The plaintiff contracted a severe illness as a result of the exposure, and seeks
to recover damages for injuries suffered.
Considering the case as we have, we are
of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover damages forinjuries suffered on
account of the unjustifiable disregard of
his rights on the part of the railroad company.
L. PHILIP COBLENTZ, J.
WALTER WILLIAMS vs. C. V. R. IR.
COMPANY.
Liability of common carrier.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff -went to the station of the
defendant in Carlisle an hour before the
train started to purchase a ticket, but the
office wasmot open. He took his valise to
the baggage room and asked to have it
checked. The baggage master refused to
give him a check, it being the rule of the
company that he should not do so until
ticket is procured. He allowed plaintiff
to put his valise in the room where there
were a large number of other pieces of
baggage.
Five minutes before the time at which
the train left Williams went to the.station
to get his valise. Without any fault of
his, his valise had been mixed with other
unchecked baggage. He was so delayed
in finding the valise that he had no time
to buy a ticket.
On the train the conductor demanded
the regular fare and ten cents additional.
He declined to pay the extra ten cents
and was ejected. This action is brought
to recover damages sustained.
KOSTENBANDER and HEIST for the
plaintiff.
1. The defendant company is liable for
the baggage, even, though no check has
been given, (Hickox v. R. R. Co., 31 Coni.
281; Green v. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 41
Iowa 410), or if ticket has not yet been
purchased. Green v. Milwaukee R. R.
Co., Supra; Hickox v. R. R. Co., Supra.
Lake Shore R. R. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind
293.
2. Baggage master's negligence is the
proximate cause of plaintiff's loss.
DEEBLE and KATZ for the defendant.
1. Defendant was a "gratuitous bailee"
and is liable only for gross negligence.
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154 Pa. 296. The rules of the company
relative to checking baggage and exacting
ten cents extra in fares paid on the train
are reasonable. The passenger must acquaint himself with such rules, and if he
oes not, a carrier is not liable. Terra
Haute R. R. Co., 111 Ill., 202; 2 Wood on
Railroads, Pg. 1203; Reese v. Pa. R. R.
Co., 131 Pa. 422; Manchester R. R. Co.,
132 Mass. 116; Ritter v. P. & R. R. R. Co.,
2 V. N: C. 382; 3 Wood on Railroads, Pg.
1668; Lake Shore and Mich. Southern R.
R. v. Rosenzeweig, 113 Pa. 519.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is the opinion of the court that it is
immaterial whether or not the deposit of
the baggage was a gratuitous bailment.
The point of law involved here is whether,
under the circumstances cited, the defendant could compel the plaintiff to pay
the extra ten cents, which was customary
to charge passengers who had not purchased their tickets at the ticket office.
Williams, the plaintiff, arrived one
hour before train time and found the
ticket office closed. He returned five
minutes before train time, but by his own
negligence in not allowing himself sufficient time to get his baggage which he
had left in the baggage room unchecked,
he was unable to get a ticket at the office
and had to board the train without one.
One of the regulations of the company
was that passengers, who had not purchased their tickets at the ticket office,
should pay an additional ten cents to the
conductor above the usual fare. This the
plaintiff refused to do and was consequently ejected.
It was unreasonable for the plaintiff to
expect to find the ticket office at Carlisle
open one hour before train time. In fact
such has never been the custom and the
traffic does not warrant it. Hence the
plaintiff should have returned within a
reasonable time to purchase his ticket,
when the ticket office was open.
It is a recognized rule of law that carriers have power to make and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of their business. Passengers and other persons who avail themselves of the accommodations offered by
such carriers must inform themselves of
such regulations and observe them. Wood
on R. R. page 1203, vol. 2.
If the defendant had not given- the

plaintiff an opportunity to purchase the
ticket at the ticket office, another question
might present itself. However, it is acknowledged that such an opportunity was
offered by the defendant, and that the
plaintiff did not allow himself enough
time to take advantage of it.
Carriers of passengers have a right to
make all regulations for the proper conduct of their business which are not unreasonable.
Bennett v. R. R. Co., 7 Phila. 11; McElroy v. R. R. Co., 7 Phila. 206.
The regulation is one which exists on
all railroads and is reasonable because it
facilitates the collection of fares and protects the company from possible embezzlement by conductors, and it should make
no difference whether a rebate is given for
the additional charge or a discount is,
given to the parties who purchase their
tickets at the ticket office.
Reese v. Penn R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 422;
Ritten v. Phila. R. R. Co., 2 W. N. C 382.
Judgment for defendant.
WALT. TAYLOR, J.
In the case at bar the plaintiff, Walter
Williams, went to the station of the Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. in Carlisle one
hour before time and found the ticket
office closed. He took his valise to the
baggage room, where the baggage master
refused to check it because he had no
ticket. He allowed Williams to leave it
in the room with a lot of other baggage.
Five minutes before train time, Williams
returned for his valise but found that
through no fault of his it was so mixed
with a lot of unchecked baggage that
when found he bLad no time to, purchase a
ticket, so boarded a train without one.
On the train the conductor demanded the
regular fare plus ten cents. He declined
to pay the excess and was ejected. He
brings this action to recover.
It is a well established fact that a R. R.
Company may charge persons, who by
their own fault are unprovided with tickets, any amount of excess fare provided
they do not exceed the rate allowed by
charter or any reasonable sum with a rebate ticket. This is allowed that the company may protect itself from conductors
appropriating fares. But the person must
be without a ticket through his own fault.
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If by negligence of some of the company's
agents he is not bound to pay excess.
The decisions hold that a R. R. Company assumes the duties and liabilities of
a common carrier when it receives the
person's baggage whether checked or not
and even if he has no ticket if there is the
understanding that he is to purchase one.
In 31 Conn. 281, Butler, 3., quoting from
"Redfield on Railways," says: "The delivery and acceptance, the abandonment
of all care of the baggage by the passenger
and the assumption of it by the agents of
the company or carrier expressly or impliedly for the purpose of transportation,
which fix the liability of the carriers as
such, and that liability begins when the
baggage is delivered to the agent of the
company for carriage."
In Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co., 5
Cush. 69, the court held it to be the duty
of a company to keep an agent to take
charge of the baggage of parties not having tickets but intending to get them.
In order to clear himself from negligence the intended passenger must allow
a reasonable time in which to get his
ticket, and we think that in this case five
minutes was ample time for him to get a
ticket, recover his valise and have it
checked, and if it had not been for the
negligence of the company's agent in mixing it with other baggage he would have
done so. Common carriers are liable for
slight negligence. The company in accepting his valise assumed the duties and
obligations of a common carrier. Wil
liams, the plaintiff, was prevented from
buying a ticket by the agent's negligence,
in which case he was not bound by the
law allowing companies -to charge excess
fare to persons unprovided with tickets.
In view of these facts we think plaintiff
should recover damages in this action.
C. C. SLOAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The court below being equally divided
upon the ability of the plaintiff on the
facts to recover, judgment went for the
defendant. The plaintiff therefore appeals to this court.
The rule of the company requires passengers nQt having a ticket to pay ten
cents more than the ordinary fare. When
the conductor demanded this additional

fare, Williams refused to pay it, and was
thereupon ejected from the train. That a
passenger who has not paid and refuses to
pay his fare may be ejected, is too well established to require citation of authority.
That the company may require an additional fare from those who have boarded
the car without a ticket is also well settled.
Reese v. Pa. R. R., 131 Pa. 422; Lake
Shore Railway Co. v. Greenwood, 79 Pa.
373; Ritter v. Phila. and Reading R. R.
2 W. N. 382. Primafacie therefore Williams was properly ejected by the conductor.
He justifies his refusal to pay the additional 10 cents by the allegation and evidence that he was prevented from buying
a ticket before mounting the car by the
improper acts of the servants of the company. What are these acts?
When he requested the baggage master
to check the satchel that servant refused
because of a rule forbidding him to do so
until a ticket had been procured. This
rule is entirely reasonable. The master
should have some evidence that the
satchel is entitled to carriage, and the
production of the ticket by its owner is
reasonable evidence. Coffee v. Louisville
& Nashville R. R., (Miss.) 45 L. R. A. 112.
The baggage-master, however, while refusing to check the satchel, received it into
the baggage-room, ashe should have done.
Up to this point no negligence is imputable to the railroad. It seems, however,
that during the fifty or fifty-five minutes
that followed the satchel had become
"mixed with other unchecked baggage,"
so that when Williams came for it, the
search consumed time and he was obliged
to mount the car without a ticket, or wait
for the next train. He preferred to mount
the car.
When he decided to board the car, we
think he should have also decided to pay
the additional fare. The conductor was
bound, as he knew, by a rule which required him to put passengers off who
neither offered a ticket nor the additional
fare. The conductor could know whether
the ticket or this fare was produced; but
he could- not know the facts asserted by
Willia'ms to excuse him. It would be
unreasonable to require the conductor to
decide upon these facts on the mere asser-
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tion of the passenger. If Williams, in
fact, had a good cause for not obtaining a
ticket, he might possibly recover the additional fare from the company, after
paying it; but he should have paid it, and
avoided expulsion from the carby the conductor under circumstances seeming to
that officer to justify and require such expulsion.
It does not distinctly appear that the
delay in discovering the satchel was the
result of any improper act of the baggagemaster, or the servant of the company.
Nor is it entirely clear that a passenger
may wait until five minutes before the
train starts, before he goes to the station.
Did he startfor the station, or did he reach
the station, five minutes before the departure of the train? At what time did
he begin his search for the satchel? And
how long .did he search before he found
it? Was the inability to get the ticket
due in part to the number of passengers
ahead of him at the window? The evidence furnished by the plaintiff is entirely
too vague to justify the finding by a jury
that the failure to get a ticket was due to
an unduly long search for the satchel, occasioned by what had happened in the
baggage-room.
Judgment affirmed.
OVERSEERS OF POOR vs. JOHN

HALL.
Parent'sliabilityfor support of child.

father, John Hall, that they would hold
him liable. The first month the overseers
paid fourteen dollars ($14.00) for necessaries, and they now bring this suit against
John Hall to recover the fourteen dollars.
RYAN and MACDONALD for the plaintiff.
1. The defendant is liable both under
the common and statute law. Act of
June 13, 1836, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3544. This is
not so where the child has obtained his
majority, unless he has always subsisted
by the parent.
2. When the parentrefuses to maintain,
he is liable for necessaries provided for the
child by others. Act of June 13. ]836,
Sec. 29, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3545, and See. 4, Id.
2 P. & L. Dig. 3531, as to duty of the overseers.
YEAGER and MIss MARVEL for the defendant.
I. The legal duty of a father to support
his child ceases as soon as child becomes
of age. 2 Kent Coin. 189-190; Boyd v.
Sapington, 4 Watts 247; Clement's Appeal,
18 Co. Ct. 71; Central PoorDist. v. B irner,
5 Kulp 265; Mt. Pleasant Overseers v.
Wilcox, 12 C. C. 447.
2. The father cannot be liable under
Act of June 13, 1836, for that act does not
provide for the support of the wife. The
poor person must be "not able to work,"
and the father, etc., must be of "sufficient
ability."
Mft. Pleasant Overseers v. Wilcox, 12 C. C. 447; Com. v. Miller, 8 0. C.
526; Bradford Co. Poor Dist. v. Case, 2 C.
C. 644. The action is wrongly brought.
According to the Act of June 13,1836, the
overseers should petition the Court of
Quarter Sessions for an order. See supplement passed April 15. A857, 2 P. & L.
Dig. 3545; Wertz v. Blair Co.. 66 Pa. 18;
Delaney Twp. v. Greenwich Twp. C6 Pa.
63; Darlington v. Darlington. 5 C. C. 1:32.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Adam Hall is partially blind but strong
and able to do manual labor not requiring
ordinary sight. A. can see well enough
to walk without being led by the hand,
and can go alone to any place where he
has once been. He is twenty-five years
,,d; has always lived with his father,
John Hall, in the Township of R., and has
refused to work.
A. has lately married. His wife lived
with him and was also supported by John
Hall. A. still refused to work and John
l all refused to board A. and his wife any
longer. A. had no means of his own and
applied to the Overseers of the Poor of the
Township of R., who supplied A. and hi s
wife with necessaries and notified A.'s

This is an attempt to compel a father to
reimburse a township for the support of
his son. The 28th section of the. Act of
June 13, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3544, enacts that
"the father * * * 0 * of every poor
person not able to work shall, at their own
charge, being of sufficient ability, relieve
and maintain such poor person at such
rate as the court of quarter sessions of the
county where such poor person resides
shall order and direct, on pain of forfeiting 6i sum not exceeding $20 for every
month they shall fail therein, which shall
be levied by the process of the said court
and applied to the relief and maintenance
of,such poor person."
The person for whose support the father
is thus made liable, is a "poor person not

THE FORUM.
able to work." Adam Hall is "partially
blind, but strong and able to do manual
labor not requiring ordinary sight." He
has also "refused to work."1 It does not
appear that he is "not able to work." He
is 2.5 years old. One of the pre-conditions
to the liability of John Hall is therefore
non-existent. Clements' Petition, 18 Pa.
C. C. 71; Poor District v. Hirner, 5 Kulp
265; Mt. Pleasant Overseers v. Wilcox, 12
Pa. C. C. 447.
The father is to relieve and maintain his
child at his own charge, "being of sufficient ability." Comv. Miller, 8 Pa. C. C.
525. We have discovered no evidence of
the ability of John Hall. Adam had always lived with his father until recently.
But from this we might as readily infer
that the father has refused to board him

any longer because of inability, as that he
had retained his ability but lost his disposition.
It does not appear that John Hall has
any estate. He may have only the skill
and force of his hands as a source of income, and this may be too meagre to be
divided between himself and his son.
Com. v. Miller, 8 Pa. C. C. 525.
The jurisdiction for the enforcement of
the liability of the father is not in the
common pleas, where the present action is
brought, but in the quarter sessions. Sec.
28, Act June 13th, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3544;
Sec. 1. Act April 15th, 1857; 2 P. & L. 3545;
Wertz v. Blair county, 66 Pa. 18.
For the reasons stated, judgment is entered on -thecase stated in favor of the defendant.

